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Kraus: Kraus: Arbitration Agreements between Employers and Employees

Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees:
The Sixth Circuit Says the EEOC Is

Not Bound
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.1

I. INTRODUCTION
If an employee attempts to forego arbitration and instead files a lawsuit, the
employer can obtain a court order to compel the employee to arbitrate the dispute.2
The employee, however, is not the only party that may have a dispute with the
employer. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has the
authority to file suit against employers in order to promote the public interest of
preventing employment discrimination.' Such action by the EEOC may include
seeking monetary relief for the employee.4
In Frank's Nursery, however, the EEOC pursued court action against an
employer that included monetary relief for the employee even though there was an
individual arbitration agreement between the employer and employee. 5 Should the
arbitration agreement restrict the EEOC from bringing such action? Currently, there
is a split in the circuits on this issue. According to the Sixth Circuit in Frank's
Nursery, the EEOC is not bound by the arbitration agreement and, therefore, can
pursue court action against the employer that includes monetary relief on behalf of
the employee. 6 The Second Circuit, however, has not allowed the EEOC to pursue
monetary relief in this situation Considering that monetary relief is a valuable
remedy for the EEOC in pursuing its goal of promoting the public interest of
preventing unlawful employment discrimination and that this goal differs from the
goal(s) of an individual employee, the Sixth Circuit properly found that an individual
arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee should not limit the
enforcement options of the EEOC.

I. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
5. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453.
6. Id. at 468.

7: EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Carol Adams, an African American woman, was hired as an Executive Assistant
9
by Frank's Nursery & Crafts ("Frank's")' on August 30, 1993. Prior to considering
Adams for the position, Frank's required Adams to sign an agreement stating that all
employment claims would be subject to compulsory arbitration.'°
Adams worked at Frank's as an Executive Assistant for Leonard Cohen" until
2
January of 1995, when Cohen was replaced with Carol Cox, a white female.' Cox
created a new position called the Executive Administrative Assistant position and
3
hired an outside applicant, Lorrain Kryszak, also white, to fill the position.' Cox
claimed that "she needed to hire someone more qualified [than Adams] for the
job." 4 "Adams continued to [assist] the Director of Human Resources and the
Manager of Human Resources and continued receiving the same pay and benefits."'"
On Kryszak's first day of work, March 14, 1995, Adams filed a complaint of racial
discrimination with the EEOC claiming that Frank's "bypassed" her for promotion
because of her race.' 6 Adams
to the Executive Administrative Assistant position
7
1995.'
4,
then resigned from Frank's on April
Upon investigation, the EEOC' s determined that Frank's "failed to establish that
Adams was not qualified for the position,"' 9 "that Frank's did not even allow Adams
to submit a formal application for the position,"2 that Frank's failed to show that
Kryszak was more qualified than Adams, 2' and concluded that Adams's race was the
reason Frank's did not promote her.22 After unsuccessful conciliation attempts with
Frank's, the EEOC filed suit against Frank's alleging unlawful employment
practices. 23 The EEOC claimed Frank's did not promote Adams to Executive
Administrative Assistant because of her race and that Frank's unlawfully required
Adams and other employment applicants to sign an agreement to arbitrate statutory

8. Frank's is a lawn and garden products retailer. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452.

9.Id.
10. Id. at 452-53. Frank's required all applicants to complete and sign compulsory arbitration

agreements prior to consideration for employment. In this agreement the employee agreed that
arbitration would be the "exclusive remedy for any and all claims" and that claims would not be
submitted later than six months after the employee's termination. Any statute of limitations to the
contrary was also waived by the employee. Id.

11. Adams was Executive Assistant to Leonard Cohen, Vice President of Human Resources and also
"provided administrative support" to the Director of Human Resources and the Manager of Human
at 453.
Resources. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 453.

18. The EEOC has the power to prevent unlawful employment practices pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1994).
19. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453.

at453 n.1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 453.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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claims arising under Title VII.24 The EEOC asked the court to award Adams
backpay, prejudgment interest, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.25
Adams did not independently pursue arbitration, a private settlement, a private
in the EEOC's lawsuit regarding her discrimination claim
lawsuit, nor intervention
26
against Frank's.
On November 21, 1996, Frank's petitioned the district court requesting that
Adams be compelled to arbitrate in accordance with her pre-employment arbitration
agreement. 27 The EEOC filed a response in opposition to Frank's petition, to which
Frank's filed a reply and moved for summary judgment.2"
The district court granted Frank's motion for summary judgment and motion to
compel arbitration and the court dismissed the EEOC's entire complaint.2 9 The
district court found that (1) Adams's arbitration agreement was enforceable,30 (2)
"the EEOC was bound by Adams's agreement to arbitrate,"'" and (3) in this case, the
EEOC could not sue on behalf of a class of individuals.3 2
The EEOC appealed 33 and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that the EEOC is not bound by Adams's arbitration agreement,34 and the EEOC can
pursue a claim for monetary relief on behalf of Adams. 5
Judge Nelson, siding with the Second Circuit, dissented, in part, stating that
monetary damages asserted by the EEOC on behalf of Adams would result in Adams
getting around the arbitration agreement undermining the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.36

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The fact that six months had passed since Adams was bypassed for promotion and that six
months had passed since Adams's resignation was not disputed by the EEOC. Id. The EEOC also did
not dispute that the pre-employment arbitration agreement signed by Adams would bar any attempt by
Adams to arbitrate any relief, since it contained a six-month limitation. Id.
27. Id. at 453-54. Frank's also claimed Adams must arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act
("F.A.A."). Id. Section 4 of the F.A.A. provides "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure ... of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition... United States district court
...
for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
28. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 454.
29. Id.
30. Id. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that an employee
may be compelled to arbitrate a discrimination dispute pursuant to the arbitration agreement).
31. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 454.
32. Id. The court did find that the EEOC generally could sue on behalf of a class of individuals, but
the EEOC just could not do so in this case because they had not identified a class of individuals that
suffered race discrimination through Frank's employment practices. Id.
33. Id. at 454-55. In the EEOC's appeal, they challenged the ruling that they were bound by Adams's
arbitration agreement and, therefore, could not pursue "substantive relief such as compensatories,
punitives, backpay and prejudgment interest." Id. at 454. The EEOC also disputed the district court's
ruling that they could not gain general injunctive relief on the basis of racial discrimination because they
did not identify a class of individuals who were subjected to such discrimination. Id. However, with
regard only to this appeal, the EEOC assumed the enforceability of Adams's pre-employment arbitration
agreement. Id. at 454 n.4.
34. The EEOC represents a broader public interest. Id. at 458-59.
35. Id. The Sixth Circuit also found that the district court "impermissibly [held] the EEOC to
procedural requirements that restrain only private Title VII litigants." Id. at 459.
36. Id. at 471. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the EEOC now has exclusive jurisdiction over cases of unlawful
employment discrimination,37 this was not always the case. The EEOC, established
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was originally authorized to resolve charges of
employment discrimination only through informal conciliation efforts."a If the
EEOC was unsuccessful in obtaining voluntary compliance from employers, further
enforcement through legal action was left to the individual victims.39 Congress later
decided that the EEOC would need additional powers of enforcement so that
employers would take the EEOC seriously. 0 The resulting Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 authorized the EEOC to bring suit against employers in
federal court after conciliation attempts were unsuccessful.4 ' Although the statute
at the time only authorized the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief,42 the Supreme
Court, in order to promote the public interest of preventing unlawful employment
discrimination, allowed the EEOC to pursue monetary relief.43 It was not until the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 that Congress affirmed the Supreme Court's reasoning that
the prospect of monetary damages is taken more seriously by employers than
injunctive relief alone."4 Accordingly, Congress authorized the EEOC to pursue
compensatory and punitive damages against employers to "deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace. 45
Congress has also demonstrated a preference for enforcing private agreements
to arbitrate.' Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A."), when parties have
agreed in writing to arbitrate, the aggrieved party may petition a federal court for an
order requiring the non-complying party to arbitrate as agreed.47 In 1991, the
Supreme Court determined that an employer can compel an employee to arbitrate a
collective bargaining agreement that required the employee to arbitrate statutory
claims.48 In Gilmer, the Court found that a securities representative employee who
was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of registration and

37. This includes pursuing injunctive relief (such as reinstatement or hiring of employees) as
authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1994), and pursuing compensatory and punitive damages
on behalf of the individual employee(s) as authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).

39. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 457.
40. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 8 (1972), reprintedin
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144.
41. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 105 (1972).
42. Congress left the right to pursue monetary relief with the private victim(s). Employees were
allowed to pursue private action, which could include monetary relief, after the 180-day exclusive

jurisdiction period of the EEOC terminated and after receiving a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b) (1977); see also Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding that an individual cannot sue if no "right to sue" letter has been issued by the EEOC).
43. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).

44. Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 198 1a (1994).
45. Id.

46. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 1999).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
48. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
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employment had to arbitrate his dispute as opposed to seeking private action under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.4
The courts have grappled with the question of whether an individual's
interaction with an employer, such as filing suit, agreeing to settle, or signing an
arbitration agreement has any impact on the EEOC's ability to pursue relief against
that employer. The Third and Seventh Circuits have found that where an individual
has already litigated unsuccessfully, the EEOC is precluded from pursuing monetary
relief on behalf of the individual.50 In each of those cases, the courts found that the
EEOC was acting in a representative capacity for the individual victim and that there
was privity between the EEOC and the individual. 5' However, both circuits also
found that the EEOC was not barred from seeking an injunction to prevent future
violations. 52 Similarly, where an individual has waived her right to sue by settling
with the employer, the EEOC is precluded from pursuing monetary relief (e.g.,
back-pay) on behalf of the employee, but the EEOC may still pursue injunctive relief
(e.g., to protect a class of employees from discrimination).53 The question remains
whether the EEOC can pursue monetary relief on behalf of that employee where
there has been no settlement, but where the individual has made an arbitration
agreement with the employer.
In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has answered
no. '' 5 In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., the court ruled that an arbitration
agreement between an employee and employer precluded the EEOC from pursuing
purely monetary relief on behalf of the employee, even where the employee had
initiated no litigation, settlement or arbitration proceedings on his own.56 The court
stated that to allow such action would "permit an individual.., to make an end run
around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC [sue on the individual's
behalf]."5 Kidder cited to the district court decision in Frank'sNursery,5" as the
"only other court to have addressed this issue [and] concluded that the EEOC was
barred from seeking monetary or injunctive relief on behalf of the employee in the
federal forum where the employee had signed an arbitration agreement."5 9 However,
in the instant decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision in Frank's Nursery,' stating that the EEOC is not restricted by an
individual's actions in that recovery may be pursued "through private action or an
action by the EEOC... and the power to decide which route to follow rests in the
hands of the EEOC, not the aggrieved employee. 61

49. Id.
50. See EEOC v. Harris Chemin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. United States
Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1990).
51. See HarrisChernin, 10 F.3d at 1292-93; United States Steel, 921 F.2d at 496-97.
52. See cases cited supra note 51.
53. EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 302-03.
57. Id. at 303.
58. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
59. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300-01 n.2.
60. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
61. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 466 (6th Cir. 1998).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Sixth Circuit in Frank's Nursery found that Adams's arbitration agreement
does not bind the EEOC due to: (1) general principles of contract formation, (2)
concerns of compliance with the F.A.A., (3) discernable Congressional intent, and
(4) the inapplicability of preclusion resulting from the doctrine of res judicata. The
court determined that the EEOC can pursue a claim for monetary relief on behalf of
Adams because: (1) the scope of the EEOC's authority allows such relief, (2)
Gilmer is not exclusive, and (3) waiver principles do not apply. 62 Additionally, the
court found that the EEOC does not have to prove, as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, the existence of a class prior to pursuing relief for a class of
individuals, stating that "it is well settled that the EEOC need not comply with the
procedural requirements of Rule 23 in seeking classwide injunctive relief., 63 The
relief if able to prove only "one
court goes on to find that the EEOC may seek class
L
instance of discrimination that violates Title VII. "
According to the court, the arbitration agreement that Adams signed was a
contract with Frank's, and since the EEOC was not a party to that contract, the
EEOC was not bound by it.65 The court went on to find that although a non-party
can be held bound by a contract if privity exists between the non-party and one of
the contracting parties, there was no such privity of contract between Adams and the
EEOC. 66 Therefore, the district court could not require arbitration between the
EEOC and Frank's because these parties never agreed to arbitrate.67 Additionally,
the court stated that this finding does not undermine the F.A.A. in that one purpose
of the F.A.A. is to enforce private contracts to arbitrate. Since the EEOC was not a
party to the contract, the F.A.A.'s purpose was not infringed.68
The court indicated that Congress, in authorizing the EEOC to file suit against
employers to enforce Title VII, intended for the individual to keep their private right
of action while giving the EEOC a right to act.69 Since this presented the potential
for duplicate proceedings, Congress provided that the EEOC, and not the private
individual, would have the power to determine whether to file action on a dispute in
federal court.70 The individual can only pursue a private action after the 180-day
period of exclusive jurisdiction of the EEOC had passed and after obtaining a "right
to sue" letter from the EEOC.7' The court indicated that such "exclusive

62. Id. at 455-68.
63. Id. at 467 (quoting General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)).
64. Id. at 468.
65. Id. at 460 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)).
66. Id. at 460 n.6.
67. Id. at 460.
68. Id.at 459-61. The court also found that their decision does not conflict with Gilmer for the same
reasons. Id. at 461.
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 457-58 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 11 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2148).
71. Id. at 456. A "right to sue" letter is written permission from the EEOC for an individual to file
suit. This can be granted by the EEOC upon request by the individual if the EEOC cannot complete the
processing of the charge within 180 days of the charge being filed or when the EEOC has decided to not
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jurisdiction" is necessary to enable the EEOC to pursue the public interest concerns
of Congress and therefore prevent individuals from controlling if and when the
EEOC will file suit under Title VI7 2
The court determined that the arbitration agreement contract between Adams
and Frank's does not preclude the EEOC by the doctrine of res judicata from filing
court action. First, the court reasoned that preclusion is inapplicable because Adams
and the EEOC are not in privity.73 Second, the interests and causes of action of
Adams and the EEOC are not identical.74 The court surmised that the EEOC's
interest in furthering the general public good by preventing employment
discrimination goes beyond the private interest of Adams. 5 Third, the court found
that preclusion cannot apply because Adams had not initiated any arbitration
lawsuit, or other proceeding to which the doctrine of res judicata would
proceeding,
76
apply.
In finding that the EEOC can pursue a claim for monetary relief on behalf of
Adams, the court pointed out that federal statutes enable the EEOC to seek injunctive
relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages." The court also recognized
that even before compensatory and punitive damage remedies were explicitly
provided to the EEOC in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court had
already allowed the EEOC to use these remedies pursuant to the Congressional
purpose of protecting the public from unlawful employment discrimination. 7' The
court also found that the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer79 does not limit the
EEOC to only equitable reiefjust because an arbitration agreement is in place. The
court explains that the Supreme Court was only responding to a specific suggestion
that class actions and equitable relief were not allowed in arbitration proceedings
and, therefore, the Supreme Court was not excluding all other remedies when it
allowed class actions and equitable relief.80
The court also referred to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the EEOC as allowing
them to make claims for monetary relief.8' The court states that "individuals cannot
control ...whether and when the EEOC will sue .... The court reasoned that
Congress, by giving the EEOC discretion to sue on behalf of an individual regardless
of the individual's wishes, "conferred upon the EEOC the discretion to take away the

sue the employer and the EEOC has not reached a conciliation agreement with the employer to which
the individual is a party. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b) (1999).
72. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468. See General Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 326.
73. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 463.
74. Id.See EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1975).
75. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 463. See General Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 331.
76. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 465.
77. Id.at 455. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994).
78. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 466.
79. Gilmer did allow employers to compel employees to arbitrate as agreed in their arbitration
agreement and also stated that the existence of an arbitration agreement did not preclude the EEOC from
pursuing equitable and class-wide relief. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-33
(1991).
80. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461.
81. Id.at 468.
82. Id.
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right [of and individual] to8 3resolve through arbitration Title VII matters that
implicate the public interest.
The court found also that the principle of waiver cannot be applied to Frank's
Nursery because, in waiving her own right to sue, Adams cannot waive the EEOC's
right to sue for reasons similar to that of preclusion." The court reasoned that
Adams did not pursue any type of remedy whatsoever 5 nor did she select the type
of remedy that the EEOC chose to pursue. 6 Therefore, since she had not "waived,
settled, or previously litigated the claim,"" waiver does not prevent the EEOC from
pursuing monetary relief on her behalf, as occurred in Kidder.
Judge Nelson concurred in part, and dissented in part."8 He agreed without
elaboration with the majority in that the EEOC should not be prohibited from
pursing general injunctive relief.8 9 However, Judge Nelson sided with the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in stating that the claim for monetary relief should be
precluded by the private arbitration agreement. 9 He reasoned that Kidder was
correct in that allowing an employee to sign an arbitration agreement, but then
pursue monetary damages via the EEOC, enabled the employee to get around an
otherwise valid agreement. 9 Judge Nelson agreed with the Second Circuit in
Kidder, which stated that failing to recognize the enforceability 92of the arbitration
agreement goes against the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer.
Overall, however, the majority found that the need for the EEOC to effectively
address the public interest concerns created by unlawful employment discrimination,
as expressed by Congress, outweighed any concerns regarding an individual
employee getting around a valid arbitration agreement.

V. COMMENT
Although the Sixth and Second Circuits are split, the Sixth Circuit correctly held
that the EEOC may pursue monetary relief in court on behalf of an individual
employee even where there is an arbitration agreement between the employer and
the employee.9 This decision allows the EEOC to further the public interest of
preventing unlawful employment discrimination as directed by Congress. Since the
goals of the EEOC are markedly different from the goals of an individual with a
grievance towards their employer, the EEOC is not merely acting in the shoes of the
individual employee when pursuing monetary relief, even though the action may be

83. Id.
84. Id. at 465-67.
85. Adams only filed a complaint with the EEOC - she did not initiate an arbitration, agree to a
settlement, file a civil suit, or intervene in the EEOC's action. Id. at 453.
86. Id. at 464.
87. Id. at 465 (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1998)).
88. Id. at 468-71.
89. Id. at 468.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 471 (citing Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303).
92. Id.
93. The courts in Frank's Nursery and Kidder are the only two courts.that have addressed this issue
directly.
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on behalf of the employee. Therefore, unless restricted by another previously
discussed legal principle, the EEOC should be free to pursue its goals through
monetary relief regardless of an individual's action of signing an arbitration
agreement with an employer. It is important to note that since no other circuits have
addressed this specific issue and the Supreme Court has not ruled on this point, the
issue is ripe for Supreme Court review.
It is well established that federal agencies like the EEOC are able to dictate what
actions they will take in pursuing their goals as delegated by Congress. These goals
are not the same as an individual's goals even though the remedy ultimately used to
achieve the goal may be the same. This has been properly supported by the Supreme
Court, which has recognized that "'the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims
of discrimination,' and that 'when the EEOC acts,.., it acts also to vindicate the
public interest in preventing employment discrimination. ' ' Thus, an individual's
actions in such situations do not impact remedies available to the EEOC.
In protecting the independence and authority of the EEOC, the Sixth Circuit in
Frank'sNursery relied heavily on the theory that an individual is not allowed to take
away or circumvent the EEOC's enforcement authority by signing an arbitration
agreement with an employer.95 The court explains that "exclusive jurisdiction" was
granted to the EEOC by Congress in cases of unlawful employment discrimination 96
and that Congress intended for the EEOC and not the individual to "have complete
authority to decide which cases to bring to Federal district court. 97 This further
supports the EEOC's independence of action.
On the other side of the argument, the Second Circuit in Kidder did not allow
an employee who had agreed to arbitrate "to make an end run around the arbitration
agreement by having the EEOC pursue back pay or liquidated damages on his or her
behalf."9' The Second Circuit stated that it had struck a balance between the
EEOC's obligation to stop employment discrimination and the general interest in
furthering arbitration, by allowing the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief but not
monetary relief on behalf of the employee. 99 In practice, however, this balance
comes out light on the EEOC's end of the scale, for it results in stripping the EEOC's
ability to pursue monetary relief against employers who have entered into arbitration
agreements with their employees. This directly conflicts with the reason Congress
originally granted the EEOC the power to pursue monetary relief, i.e., to address its
concern that employers "more often than not shrugged off the [EEOC's] entreaties
and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties suing them."' ° The potential for
monetary damages is taken most seriously by employers and is, therefore, a valuable

94. Id. at 458 (quoting General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 331
1980)).
95. Id. at 456.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 457-58 (quoting EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 & n.12 (6th Cir.
1975)).
98. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998).
99. Id.
100. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 457 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 8 (1972), reprintedin 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144).
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remedy for the EEOC. Without it, they lose their ability to effectively fulfill their
reason for existence.
Although the Second Circuit in Kidder acknowledges that the Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of pursuing monetary relief to prevent employment
discrimination,'0 ' the court stated that they "see no reason to believe" that the
deterrent value of an individual pursuing monetary relief through arbitration would
be any less than that achieved by the EEOC pursuing monetary relief through court
action.0 2 However, in coming to this conclusion, the court failed to acknowledge
the Supreme Court's finding that the EEOC and the individual are not pursuing the
same interests, even if they are pursing the same relief.0 3 Even the Second Circuit's
own Judge Feinberg, in his concurring opinion, questioned this presumption of the
court." Overall, this argument of the Second Circuit is weak.
Looking to how other circuits have addressed the remedies available to the
EEOC, the court in Kidder cited to court opinions where the EEOC was prevented
from pursuing monetary relief because the individual had "waived, settled, or
previously litigated the claim" thus invoking the doctrine of res judicata.' 05
However, each of the cases cited by the Second Circuit is distinguishable from
Frank'sNursery. In the Third and Seventh Circuit cases cited, there had been prior
court action on the issue, in the Ninth Circuit case the employee had previously
agreed to a settlement, and in the Fifth Circuit case, it was found that the principles
of res judicata were not applicable.' 6 In Frank's Nursery, the employee had not
agreed to any settlement and had not pursued arbitration or litigation.' 07 All she did
was make a complaint to the EEOC.'
As Judge Feinberg stated in his concurrence with the Second Circuit in Kidder,
the EEOC would not seed monetary relief merely to assist employees in avoiding
arbitration nor would the F.A.A.'s purpose be undermined by allowing the EEOC
to pursue monetary relief. Since Congress has decided to grant the EEOC the
authority to pursue monetary relief on behalf of the individual,"°9 and the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue, the EEOC should retain the authority to pursue
monetary relief as long as monetary relief has not yet been settled, waived or
pursued by the individual employee, and the EEOC has not expressly relinquished
this power. The EEOC must be allowed to exercise its authority to pursue monetary
relief so that it may effectively work towards its goal of preventing unlawful
employment discrimination.

101. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 302-03. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
102. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303.
103. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).
104. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304.
105. Id. at 301-02. See EEOC v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993); EEOC
v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496 (3d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp.,
813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987); New Orleans Steanship Ass'n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir.
1982).
106. See HarrisChernin, 10 F.3d at 1291; United States Steel, 921 F.2d at 496; GoodyearAerospace,
813 F.2d at 1543; New Orleans Steamship Ass "n, 680 F.2d at 25.
107. Frank'sNursery, 177 F.3d at 453.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Frank'sNursery, the Sixth Circuit properly protected the EEOC's authority
from outside control. In finding that the EEOC can pursue monetary relief on behalf
of an employee despite the existence of an arbitration agreement, the Sixth Circuit
appropriately relied on Congressional intent regarding the EEOC, the Supreme
Court's opinion on the EEOC's scope of authority and the inapplicability of other
legal principles due to distinguishable facts. However, because the Second Circuit
disagrees with this determination, the resulting split must be resolved through
clarification from the Supreme Court.
EARL D. KRAUS
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